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THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT: ARE
BUSINESS CREDIT REPORTS REGULATED?
Since World War II the consumer credit industry has experienced
a phenomenal and continuing growth,' paralleled by the development
of the credit information industry 2 upon which credit grantors rely in
order to minimize the risks inherent in the extension of credit.3 Credit
bureaus typically supply information on a person's financial position,
his payment record with respect to bills and loans, and public record
information,4 but may also provide information on a person's habits,
character and morals.5 Technological innovations in data processing
and storage techniques have increased the capacity of credit bureaus
to handle large volumes of such information, but have correspond-
ingly increased the potential for abuse or error.6 The lack of sufficient
safeguards against abuse or error generated a considerable amount of
I. In 1945 the American consumer owed less than $6 billion. By 1969 he owed more than
$I 16 billion. S. REP. No. 517, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1969). See Caplovitz, Consumer Credit
in the Affluent Society, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 641, 641-45 (1968).
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS ARE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (DIVISION OF SPECIAL
PROJECTS), COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT, reprinted in 4 CCH CON-
SUMER CREDIT GUIDE I" 11,304, at 59,781 (1971) [hereinafter cited as COMPLIANCE WITH
FCRA];
CONE. REP. No. 1587, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4411 (1970) [hereinafter cited as CONF. REP.];
S. REP. No. 517, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 517].
2. "Credit bureaus maintain files on more than 110 million individuals and in 1967 issued
over 97 million credit reports." S. REP. No. 517, at 2.
3. Credit reports are also used by employers to obtain information about prospective em-
ployees. Note, Fair Credit Reporting Act, 23 MAINE L. REV. 253, 254 n.9 (1971). Likewise
included within the scope of this discussion are reports used for the purpose of determining
eligibility for insurance. See note 5 infra.
4. S. REP. No. 517, at 2.
5. Information on habits, character and morals is obtained largely through interviews with
neighbors, co-workers and other acquaintances for insurance reports, id., but may also be used
in credit reports. Note, Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy,
57 GEO. L.J. 509 n.5 (1969). The same firm may handle both credit and insurance reports. Id.
6. See Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology
in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1145-51 (1969); Comment, The
Consumer vs. the Credit Bureau: Whom Does the Law Protect?, 7 CALIF. W.L. REV. 216-18
(1970).
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public attention,7 including extensive congressional hearings, " and cul-
minated in the adoption of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).
The FCRA became effective on April 25, 1971.1" Much of' the
commentary on the Act has been limited to criticisms of the adequacy
of the protection provided the consumer." Little detailed considera-
7. Perhaps the most notorious incident calling public attention to the problems of the credit
information industry was a CBS News broadcast by Correspondent Mike Wallace on March
17, 1969. CBS News established a dummy corporation located at a rented mailbox. Using
stationery bearing the corporation's name, letters were sent to twenty credit bureaus requesting
reports on individuals whose names had been selected at random from telephone books. The
letters indicated that the corporation wished to grant them credit. Without further ado or
questions ten of the twenty bureaus mailed reports on the individuals involved back to the
fictitious corporation. The film describing this sequence of events was interspersed with sequ-
ences in which the Executive Director of the Associated Credit Bureaus of America was stating
that credit reports were available only to legitimate grantors of credit who were checked by
credit bureaus if they were not known to the agency from whom the report had been requested.
The verbal transcript of the dialogue in this film is set forth in Hearings on H.R. 16340 Before
the Subconmm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Conn. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 59-61 (1970).
8. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate had hearings on the subject of credit
reporting on more than one occasion. See Hearings on H.R. 16340, supra note 7; Hearings on
S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comnmn. on Banking and
Currency, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); Hearings on S. Res. 233 Before the Subconm. on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess, (1969);
Hearings on Commercial Credit Bureaus Before a Special Subcom. on Invasion of Privacy
of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
9. The FCRA §§ 601-22, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-8 It (1970) was enacted as part of the Act
of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114. The first four titles of this legislation were
intended to assist in the detection of white-collar crime and the illegal transfer of funds to secret
foreign bank accounts. These titles require financial institutions to maintain certain records and
report certain financial transactions to the Department of the Treasury. H.R. REP. No. 975,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970); 116 CONG. REC. S 17632-33 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1970) (remarks of
Senator Proxmire). Title V, which regulates the issuance of credit cards and creates liability
for their unauthorized use, and Title VI, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, are both non-germane
to the first four titles, having been added to the Senate version of the bill shortly before Congress
adjourned in 1970. See colloquy and action of the Senate in 116 CONG. REC. S15999-S 16005
(daily ed. Sept. 18, 1970). The House representatives on the Conference Committee agreed, with
certain modifications, to the addition of titles V and VI to the Act, CONF. REP., at 4414-16,
notwithstanding resentment by certain House members toward the tactics employed by the
Senate. 116 CONG. REC. H 10053-56 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970) (remarks of Congressmen Bow,
Widnall, and Wylie). For a colorful discussion of the instrumental role played by Senator
Proxmire in adoption of the Fair Credit Reporting Act see Denney, Federal Fair Credit Report-
ing Act, 88 BANKING L.J. 579 (1971).
10. The FCRA became effective 180 days after its enactment. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, § 602,
84 Stat. 1136.
II. See Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1061-69 (1971);
Fair Credit Reporting Act, supra note 3, at 257-64; Comment, Agency Access to Credit Bureau
Files: Federal Invasion of Privacy?, 12 B.C. IND. & CoN. L. REV. 110, 123-24 (1970).
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tion, however, has been given to the actual workings of the FCRA1 2
and the potential problems in its interpretation. The purpose of this
note is to examine the provisions of the FCRA with a view toward
pointing out one such interpretive problem, namely, the applicability
of the FCRA to credit reports prepared on businesses.
The Provisions of the FCRA
The FCRA is intended to ensure that consumer reporting agen-
cies 3 dispense information in a manner which is fair and equitable to
the consumer, 4 "with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy,
relevancy, and proper utilization of such information . . . ."I' This
statement of purpose was based on congressional findings that ac-
curate credit reporting is vital to the banking system,1" that credit
reporting agencies play an important role in determining the eligibility
of consumers to receive credit, 7 and that a need existed for legislation
to ensure that the credit system operated fairly toward consumers.' 8
Specifically the FCRA is designed to provide the consumer with cer-
tain rights vis-a.-vis credit reporting agencies and the users of credit
12. One exception is Koon, Translating the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 48 DENVER L.J. 51
(1971). But see note 90 infra.
13. A "consumer reporting agency" is any entity which "regularly engages in whole or in
part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other informa-
tion on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which
uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing
consumer reports." FCRA § 603(f), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1970). No authoritative interpre-
tation of the word "regularly" is available, although the FTC staff has indicated that an
institution which from "time to time" issues consumer reports will be considered a consumer
reporting agency. COMPLIANCE WITH FCRA 4 11,305, at 59,787. However, in the Guidelines
for Financial Institutions in Complying with Fair Credit Reporting Act (prepared jointly by
the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board), 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE w 11,203, at 59,757, the word "regularly" is underscored in such a way as to suggest
that institutions which issue consumer reports only in isolated instances will not be so consid-
ered.
14. The word "consumer" means "an individual." FCRA § 603(c), 15 U.S.C. § 168la(c)
(1970).
15. FCRA § 602(b), 15 U.S.C. § 168 1(b) (1970) (congressional statement of purpose).
16. Id. § 602(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 168 1(a)(1) (1970). See note 8 supra.
17. Id. § 602(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 168 1(a)(3) (1970).
18. Id. § 602(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(4) (1970). More specifically, the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency delineated seven problems which needed correction: (I) the inability
of the consumer to know he is being damaged by an adverse credit report; (2) the inability of
the consumer to get access to the information in his file even if he knows the name of the credit
reporting agency which has supplied an adverse report; (3) the difficulty in having inaccurate
information in a file corrected, even if access thereto has been gained; (4) the failure of the
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reports" by specifying certain procedures to which credit reporting
agencies and users of credit reports must adhere, limiting the permis-
sible uses of the consumer report, and providing machinery for the
enforcement of the above provisions of the Act.
Procedures required by the act. When a consumer is adversely
affected by information contained in a consumer report, the user of
the report must notify him of the adverse action and provide him with
the name and address of the agency making the report.20 The con-
industry to maintain information in strict confidence; (5) the inclusion of highly subjective
information of a personal and sensitive nature which may be only marginally related to credit
worthiness and which may unreasonably invade an individual's privacy; (6) the failure to keep
public record information included on credit reports up to date; and (7) the inability of the
subject of an adverse credit report to overcome the stigma which attaches, so that even though
his performance subsequently improves, he may be faced with having his earlier poor perform-
ance on his record permanently. See S. REP. No. 517, at 3-4.
19. Senator Proxmire aptly summarized the "rights" provided the consumer by the FCRA
in describing the bill to the Senate as follows:
First. To be told the reasons for a credit, insurance or employment turndown when
a credit report was a factor and to be given the name and address of the reporting agency.
Second. To be informed on the nature and substance of all information in his credit
file by the credit reporting agency.
Third. To have another person with him at the reporting agency when his file is
discussed.
Fourth. To be told who has received reports on him during the proceeding [sic] 6
months for credit or insurance purposes and the preceeding [sic] 2 years for employment
purposes.
Fifth. To have inaccurate or unverifiable information deleted from his file.
Sixth. To have the information in his file reinvestigated whenever he disputes its
accuracy.
Seventh. To file a brief explanatory statement on disputed items and to have the
statement included on subsequent reports.
Eighth. To have the information in his file kept confidential and used only for
legitimate business purposes.
Ninth. To have personal information in his file kept from governmental agencies
unless ordered by a court.
Tenth. To be informed if adverse public record information is reported for employ-
ment purposes when such information cannot be kept up to date.
Eleventh. To have adverse information deleted from his file after 7 years or after 14
years in the case of bankruptcies.
Twelfth. To be informed of the scope and nature of investigative-type reports into
his personal life.
Thirteenth. To have adverse information on investigative-type reports reverified be-
fore it can be used again.
Fourteenth. To bring civil actions against credit reporting agencies and collect actual
damages plus attorney's fees if the agency is negligent in reporting inaccurate informa-
tion. 116 CONG. REC. S 17635-36 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1970).
20. FCRA § 615, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1970). § 1681m(a) (1970). This requirement is
also applicable when the charge for credit or insurance is increased because of the contents of a
consumer report. Id.
sumer may then contact the reporting agency and, upon proper identi-
fication, the agency is required to disclose the "nature and substance
of all information (except medical information) in its files on the
consumer" at the time the request is made, 2 including the sources of
such information. 22 In addition, the reporting agency must furnish the
names of any persons who have received a report on the consumer
within the last six months,23 unless the report was for employment
purposes, in which case the identity of any persons receiving it within
the prior two years must be disclosed. 24
Upon giving a consumer access to his file, 25 the reporting agency
is required to provide trained personnel to explain its contents to
21. FCRA § 609(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 1681g(a)(l) (1970). There is some question as to what
the words "nature and substance" mean. It is apparently agreed that this language does not
give the consumer the right to physically handle his file. CONF. REP., at 4415. The Conference
Report on the bill indicates that the intent of the provision is to require disclosure of all infor-
mation, id., a reading confirmed by the discussion of the language of the provision on the House
floor. 116 CONG. REC. H10051-52 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970) (remarks of Congresswoman
Sullivan). See also Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter of April 8, 1971, 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,522 (1971). But see 116 CONG. REC. S 17637 (daily ed. Oct. 9,
1970) (remarks of Senator Bennett).
The term "medical information" is limited to records obtained from physicians, other
practitioners, or hospitals and clinics which are obtained with the consent of the consumer to
whom they relate, FCRA § 603(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i) (1970), and does not include com-
ments on a consumer's health by non-medical personnel. COMPLIANCE WITH FCRA 11,306,
at 59,793-94. The reasons for exempting medical information from disclosure were that raw
medical information should be tendered to a consumer only with the counsel of a physician,
CONF. REP., at 4414, and that it was necessary to protect the traditional physician-patient re-
lationship. 116 CONG. REC. S17634 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1970) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
Neither of these reasons appears to have much substance. A consumer is probably as well
qualified to interpret medical data about himself as the average credit bureau or credit grantor.
Moreover, if a reporting agency does have medical data, it necessarily would have been ac-
quired with the consent of the consumer, under the terms of the Act, and the issue of confident-
iality would not come into play.
22. FCRA § 609(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 168lg(a)(2) (1970). The sources of information ac-
quired solely for use in "investigative consumer reports" are exempted from the disclosure
requirements, but are available to the plaintiff under appropriate discovery procedures in court
actions. Id. Investigative reports are discussed in the text accompanying notes 33-40 infra.
23. FCRA § 609(a)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 168 lg(a)(3)(B) (1970).
24. Id. § 609(a)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 168 1g(a)(3)(A) (1970). When a credit grantor denies
credit for personal, household or family purposes on the basis of information obtained from a
third party other than a consumer reporting agency he, too, is required to disclose the nature of
the information which led to his decision if the consumer so requests within 60 days of the ad-
verse action. FCRA § 615(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(b) (1970). This provision, notably, does
not extend to denials of employment or insurance resulting from a communication from a non-
consumer reporting agency, see FCRA § 615(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (1970), a limitation
that has justly been described as "nonsensical," see Koon, supra note 12, at 63.
25. The disclosure described in the foregoing paragraph must be made during normal
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him."6 If the consumer disputes the completeness or accuracy of any
item contained in his file, the reporting agency is required to reinvesti-
gate the matter unless it has reasonable grounds to believe that the
complaint is frivolous.27 If the reinvestigation reveals that the con-
tested information is inaccurate, or if it cannot be verified, the infor-
mation must be deleted from the consumer's file.2" When the reinvesti-
gation does not resolve the disagreement to the satisfaction of the
consumer, he is permitted to prepare a summary of the dispute"
which must be included in any subsequent report that contains the
disputed information." Such a statement may be limited to one
hundred words if the reporting agency assists the consumer in prepar-
ing the written statement .3 The reporting agency is required to furnish
notification of any correction made on the report to anyone desig-
nated by the consumer who has received a report within the last six
months, or who has received a report for employment purposes within
the prior two years.3 2
business hours after reasonable notice by the consumer. FCRA § 610(a), 15
U.S.C. § 168 lh(a) (1970). The consumer may receive the information in person or by telephone
if he has made a written request in advance, after providing reasonable identification in each
case. FCRA § 610(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(b) (1970). Further, he may be accompanied by one
person of his choosing when receiving such information. Id. § 610(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(d)
(1970).
It has been stated that the Act "does not require the bureau even to notify subjects of the
location of the report" (emphasis original) and that "[tlhis omission emasculates the disclosure
requirement." Note, 80 YALE L.J., supra note 11, at 1064. It is not immediately apparent what
value there is in knowing the location of the report or how its omission emasculates the disclo-
sure requirement, particularly since the location of the report is increasingly likely to be in the
memory bank of a computer. More to the point is whether the consumer is actually able to learn
the contents of his file.
26. FCRA § 610(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(c) (1970).
27. Id. § 611(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (1970). The statute provides that "the presence of
contradictory information in the consumer's file does not in and of itself constitute reasonable
grounds for believing the dispute is frivolous. ... Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 61l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b) (1970).
30. Id. § 61 1(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(c) (1970). This provision again, is not applicable if there
are reasonable grounds for believing the dispute is frivolous. Id. It appears designed to encour-
age reporting agencies to expunge contested information since they may avoid including a
consumer's statement in subsequent reports by doing so.
31. Id. § 611(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b) (1970). It has been suggested that the merits of
including a consumer's statement in a consumer report is at best debatable because users of
such reports will give such statements little credence, if any. Comment, The Consumer vs. the
Credit Bureau: Whom Does the Law Protect?, supra note 6, at 234, While this argument is
persuasive, it must be noted that credit grantors presumably want to extend credit and thereby
do business, rather than the contrary, and that this factor may offset the former.
32. FCRA § 611(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(d) (1970). These procedures are carried out at the
expense of the reporting agency if the consumer has requested disclosure within thirty days of
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Investigative consumer reports 33 are subject to the same disclosure
requirements as other consumer reports, 3' "except that the sources of
information acquired solely for use in preparing an investigative con-
sumer report and actually used for no other purpose need not be
disclosed. ' 31 The latter provision was deemed necessary to protect the
sources of personal information.36 Whenever an investigative report
on a consumer is requested, however, the consumer must be advised
that an investigation of his character, general reputation, and mode
of living may be made.37 Such notice must also advise the consumer
that he is entitled to a further disclosure 3 detailing the nature and
scope of the investigation which may be conducted .3  Finally, adverse
the time he was notified that an adverse decision had been made on the basis of the report. Id.
§ 612, 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (1970). If he does not request disclosure until after thirty days the
reporting agency may impose a reasonable charge for both disclosure and notification of correc-
tions, except that no charge may be made for notification that information which was inaccurate
or which could not be verified was deleted. When such a charge is made it may not exceed that
imposed upon the recipient of a consumer report. Id.
33. The term "investigative consumer report" is defined as "a consumer report or portion
thereof in which information on a consumer's character, general reputation, personal character-
istics, or mode of living is obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or
associates," but not including factual information on a consumer's credit record received from
creditors or from a reporting agency which obtained the information from a creditor or the
consumer himself. FCRA § 603(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e) (1970). This definition creates ob-
vious difficulties in that a reporting agency must distinguish between what is subjective opinion,
and what is factual information, a matter undoubtedly open to subjective judgment. See
COMPLIANCE WITH FCRA 1 11,304, at 59,787. In an interesting staff opinion the FTC has
determined that reports on interviews conducted with the members of a consumer's immediate
family are not investigative reports because these are not the type of third parties contemplated
by the statute, even though a consumer is "acquainted" with such persons. Excerpts from FTC
Informal Staff Opinion Letter of May 20, 1971, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE Ir 99,425
(1971).
34. This is clear from the definition of an investigative consumer report, see note 33 supra,
and from the fact that specific reference is made to investigative reports under the consumer
report disclosure provisions. See FCRA § 609(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2) (1970). See also
COMPLIANCE WITH FCRA f 11,304, at 59,787, which indicates that an investigative report is
a type of consumer report.
35. FCRA § 609(2), 15 U.S.C. § 168 1g(2) (1970). But see note 24 supra.
36. Cf. Hearings on S. 823. supra note 8, at 173 (statement of W. Lee Burge, President,
Retail Credit Co., Atlanta, Ga.).
37. FCRA § 606(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 168ld(a)(l) (1970). Such notice must be given by a
letter mailed or otherwise delivered within three days. Id. Presumably the reason why the
notification must indicate that an investigation "may be made," rather than that it "will be
made" is because a reporting agency may already have a current investigative report on hand.
38. Id.
39. Id. § 606(b), 15 U.S.C. § 168ld(b) (1970). Providing the consumer with a copy of a
standardized form used to transmit the information from the reporting agency to the user would
apparently suffice to comply with this requirement. Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion
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information, other than public record information, may not be used
again in subsequent investigative reports unless it is verified in the
course of preparing such a report or has been received within three
months of the time the subsequent report is furnished.'"
Several other provisions of the FCRA designed to protect the
consumer also deserve brief discussion. First, a reporting agency, with
certain exceptions, is prohibited from reporting any adverse informa-
tion on a consumer if the information is obsolete." Basically, any
adverse information which antedates a consumer report by more than
seven years is considered obsolete,4" except an adjudication of bank-
ruptcy, which does not become obsolete until fourteen years following
Letter of May 10, 1971, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ' 99,419 (1971). This additional
disclosure must be mailed or otherwise delivered to the consumer within five days of the time
his request is received. FCRA § 606(b), 15 U.S.C. § 168 ld(b) (1970).
An investigative report for employment purposes involving a position for which the con-
sumer has not applied is specifically exempted from both the notice and nature and scope
disclosure requirements. Id. § 606(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 168ld(a)(2) (1970). This provision ap-
pears to reflect a congressional purpose to permit employers to consider persons for a job in
secret before actually contacting an individual, and seems to be primarily applicable to situa-
tions in which the prospect is well-known in his occupation or profession, and the position
involved is relatively important. If this is indeed a reasonable construction of this provision, a
conflict arises between it and the disclosure requirements imposed upon the users of consumer
reports under Id. § 615, 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (1970), discussed in the text accompanying notes
20-24 supra, which provides that a consumer must be advised whenever adverse action is taken,
in whole or part, on the basis of a consumer report. The FTC staff, acknowledging that the
two provisions appeared to be in conflict, resolved the dispute in favor of the consumer, opining
that "disclosures were intended to be made every time a consumer has been denied a benefit
because of information contained in a credit report." Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff
Opinion Letter of April 22, 1971, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE " 99,485, at 89,447
(1971).
40. FCRA § 614, 15 U.S.C. § 16811 (1970).
41. Id. § 604(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (1970). It should be emphasized that a reporting
agency is not required to delete such information from its files, but is only prohibited from
reporting it, so that such information will still be in a consumer's file for possible use under
circumstances not covered by the obsolescence provision. For example, the provisions proscrib-
ing the use of obsolete information are inapplicable to credit transactions involving a principal
amount of $50,000 or more, to the purchase of insurance when a face amount of $50,000 or
more is likely to be involved, and with respect to reports issued for employment purposes when
the starting salary is likely to be $20,000 or more. Id. § 605(b), 15 U.S.C. § 168 lc(b) (1970).
For a brief discussion of the amendments to section 604 made by the Congressional Confer-
ence Committee, see CONF. REP. at 4414-16.
42. FCRA § 605(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a) (1970). An extension of the seven year period
can result in the case of suits and judgments, with respect to which the item may be noted on a
report until the applicable statute of limitations has expired. Id. §. 605(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681c(a)(2) (1970).
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the date of adjudication. 43 The Act also imposes additional restric-
tions with respect to public record information furnished for employ-
ment purposes. 4 If such information is furnished, the reporting
agency must either notify the consumer that it has reported such
information and identify the person to whom such information has
been reported" or, alternatively, "maintain strict procedures" to en-
sure that any adverse public record information is complete and up
to date.4 Finally, consumer reporting agencies must follow reason-
able procedures to "assure maximum possible accuracy of the infor-
mation" contained in consumer reports 47 to ensure that consumer
reports are used only for permissible purposes as provided by the
Act, 48 and to verify the identity of prospective new users of reports
and the purpose for which such reports are to be used.49
43. Id. § 605(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(l) (1970). The FTC staff has opined that wage
earner plans under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Act will not be considered bankruptcies under
this provision. COMPLIANCE WITH FCRA f 11,306, at 59,791.
44. FCRA § 613, 15 U.S.C. § 168 1k (1970).
45. Id. § 613(l), 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(l) (1970).
46. Id. § 613(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(2) (1970). Items of public record are considered up to
date if the current public record status of the information at the time the report is provided to
the user is indicated. Id.
These provisions relating to public record information have been criticized both because they
apply just to information used for employment purposes and because the means of compliance,
notifying the consumer or ensuring the information is accurate, are inadequate. Note, Fair
Credit Reporting Act. supra note 3, at 258-59. The First criticism is a legitimate one, but the
second does not appear to take cognizance of the fact that when public record information is
included in either consumer reports or investigative consumer reports, it is also subject to all
the other disclosure and verification requirements imposed upon such reports by the FCRA.
47. FCRA § 607(b), 15 U.S.C. § 168le(b) (1970). While the law does not specify what
procedures must be followed to ensure accuracy, the FTC staff has indicated that the following
factors are significant: (I) the proper training of personnel; (2) ascertaining the reliability of
sources; (3) the proper recording and reproduction of data; (4) care that information is not used
out of context; (5) proper security for data systems to prevent alteration or theft of information;
(6) verification of adverse information by more than one source whenever possible; and (7) the
absence of pressure on investigators to produce adverse reports. COMPLIANCE WITH
FCRA " 11,306, at59,790-91.
48. Permissible purposes are set forth in text accompanying notes 50-63 infra. These pur-
poses are discussed in text accompanying notes 105-14 infra.
49. FCRA § 607(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) (1970). The FTC has indicated that every
reporting agency should have some system by which it verifies that it is dealing with legitimate
businesses that have a permissible purpose for using consumer reports. COMPLIANCE WITH
FCRA Ir 11,306, at 59,789. It suggests that users be required to contract or certify that they
will use consumer reports only for permissible purposes and that records of such agreements or
certification be maintained by the reporting agency. Id. For regular users of reports an initial
contract or certification is sufficient, and this process need not be repeated with respect to each
report requested. Id. The checking of references and on-site visits are recommended with respect
to new users with whom the reporting agency is not familiar. Id.
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Limitations on the use of a consumer report. It must be noted at
the outset that the FCRA is applicable only to consumer reports 0
Moreover, the FCRA specifically limits the purposes for which con-
sumer reports may be used.5 1 In section 603 the term "consumer
report," is defined as:
...any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a con-
sumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit
standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteris-
tics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole
or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's
eligibility for (1) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family,
or household purposes, or (2) employment purposes, or (3) other purposes
authorized under section 604.52
50. Congressional intent that the FCRA should apply to consumer reports, and not business
or commercial reports is rather clear. The Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency states ". . . the bill does not cover business credit reports or business insurance
reports." S. REP. No. 517, at 1. This limitation was reiterated by Senator Proxmire in his
description of the bill to the Senate, 116 CONG. REC. S 17635 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1970), and again
by Congressman Bow and Congresswoman Sullivan in the discussion of the FCRA in the House
of Representatives. 116 CoNG. REc. H10052-53 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970). This evidence of
Congressional intent has been duly noted by the FTC. See Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff
Opinion Letter of April 22, 1971, note 39 supra at 89,445. But see Anonymous v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 40 U.S.L.W. 2162 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. City. Sept. 28, 1971), in which Dun &
Bradstreet was ordered to expunge certain obsolete information from a business report on a
single-shareholder corporation, notwithstanding the court's clear recognition that the report was
not within the scope of the FCRA. The decision was justified on the basis of the public policy
of the FCRA-"that obsolete information should not be utilized in credit reports to the detri-
ment of an individual. ... ." Id.
Title V of Public Law 91-508, see note 9 supra, which regulates the issuance and use of credit
cards, has also been held to be inapplicable to credit cards used for business or commercial
purposes, see Excerpts from FRB Letters of June 4, 1971 & July 15, 1971, 4 CCH CoNsULR
CREDIT GUIDE 30,682 & 30,708, although there are indications that Congress intended no
such result. See CONSUMER REPORTS, Nov. 1971, at 645. This limitation, which is not apparent
from the provisions of title V themselves, results because title V was an amendment to the Truth
in Lending Act, see Act of Oct. 26, 1970, and thereby made part of subchapter I of the
Consumer Protection Act. Section 104 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (1970),
provides in pertinent part as follows: "This subchapter does not apply to the following: (I)
Credit transactions involving extensions of credit for business or commercial purposes .. .
This particular reason is not a ground for holding the FCRA inapplicable to commercial
transactions, however, because it was added as a new title at the end of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act, see Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1136 and has
been designated as a separate subchapter I I I by the codifiers.
51. See FCRA § 604, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1970) (permissible purposes of consumer re-
ports).
52. Id. § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 168la(d) (1970). The term "consumer report" does not in-
clude a report containing information based solely on transactions or experiences between the
person making the report and the consumer, nor does it include any specific denial or extension
of credit by the issuer of a credit card. Id.; see Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter
of April 8, 1971, note 21 supra, at 89,479 and Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter
of April 22, 1971, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE I 99,486 at 89,477 (1971).
[Vol. 1971:12291238
Vol. 1971:1229] THE FCRA 1239
Included among the permissible purposes in section 604 are those
specifically itemized above in connection with the definition of the
term "consumer report"-the extension of credit 3 or purchase of
insurance for personal, family, or household purposes 4 and the deter-
mination of eligibility for employment purposes.5 5 Additional pur-
poses for which consumer reports may be used are for the review or
collection of an account of the consumer 5 and for determination of a
consumer's eligibility for a license or other governmental benefit.5 1
Finally, a user may request a consumer report when he "otherwise
has a legitimate business need for the information in connection with
a business transaction involving the consumer."8 In view of the ap-
53. FCRA § 604(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 168 lb(3)(A) (1970).
54. Id. § 604(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(C) (1970).
55. Id. § 604(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(B) (1970). Other circumstances under which
consumer reports may be furnished, not discussed in the text below, are in response to a court
order, Id. § 604(l), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(l) (1970), and in accordance with the written instruc-
tions oftheconsumer, Id. § 604(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(2) (1970).
56. FCRA § 604(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 168 lb(3)(A) (1970).
57. Id. § 604(3)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 168lb(3)(D) (1970). In addition to the permissible pur-
poses discussed in this paragraph, a consumer reporting agency may also disclose to a govern-
mental agency basic information related to identification, but limited to name, address, former
address, and place or former places of employment, Id. § 608, 15 U.S.C. § 1681f (1970).
In a recent staff opinion, excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter of May 18, 197 1,
4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 'r 99,422, at 89,382 (1971), the FTC indicated that a con-
sumer report requested by a state or federal revenue agency for the purpose of investigating tax
fraud would be prohibited by the FCRA. This is readily apparent upon consideration of section
604 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1970), which indicates that consumer reports may be used
only for the purposes specifically listed therein, and no others. Notwithstanding the result
described here, the FCRA has been criticized for failing adequately to protect an individual's
privacy on the ground that administrative agencies could subpoena information and routinely
have these subpoenas enforced by the courts. See Comment, Agency Access to Credit Bureau
Files: Federal Invasion of Privacy?, supra note I1, at 123-24. Arguably such a procedure would
meet the requirement of FCRA § 604(1), 15 U.S.C. § 168 Ib(1) (1970), which provides that a
consumer report may be furnished in response to a court order. See note 55 supra. The FCRA
contains no standards to guide a court in determining whether to enforce an administrative
subpoena, but the policy considerations behind the Act are rather clear, see notes 13-19 supra,
and it is clear that the strictures of the Act are intended to apply to governmental agencies.
Consequently it seems premature to assume that courts will routinely grant subpoenas giving
access to consumer reporting agency files. But see Comment, Agency Access to Credit Bureau
Files: Federal Invasion of Privacy?, supra, at 112-18.
The Government's utilization of consumer reports is possibly limited by other statutory
provisions as well. 5 U.S.C. § 3108 (1970) provides that no individual employed by the Pinker-
ton Detective Agency or a similar organization may be employed by the federal government.
This prohibition is applicable to contracts or agreements with detective agencies as well as to
individual employees of such agencies and precludes their employment regardless of the charac-
ter of the services to be performed, whether investigative or not. Detective Employment, Prohibi-
tion, 38 CoMP. GEN. 881 (1959). Recently an Oklahoma management consultant filed suit under
this statute in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent Retail
Credit Company, alleged to be a private detective agency, from furnishing consumer reports to
the federal government. See Washington Post, October 5, 197 1, § C, at 7, cols. 1-2.
58. FCRA § 604(3)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 168lb(3)(E) (1970).
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parent congressional intent to exclude business credit reports from the
purview of the FCRA, 59 the meaning to be ascribed to this provision
is unclear. It appears as if it were intended to be a catch-all for
purposes which Congress intended to permit but neglected to itemize
specifically, and could be reasonably so read if the words "business
transactions" were merely assumed to mean "transactions" or "fin-
ancial transactions or purposes.""0 The FTC staff, however, has read
this provision more narrowly, as extending only to business transac-
tions for personal, family, or household purposes."' To hold other-
wise, in the FTC's view, would be to permit consumer reports to be
used for purposes clearly not intended under the Act. 2
Enforcement provisions of the act. Enforcement of the FCRA
may occur on several levels. First, criminal sanctions are provided for
obtaining consumer information from a reporting agency under false
pretenses. 3 Similarly, the knowing disclosure of information from an
agency's files by an officer or employee of a reporting agency to one
not authorized to receive such information is made a criminal offense
under the Act.64 Secondly, the Act makes both consumer reporting
agencies and users liable for negligent noncompliance 5 or willful non-
59. See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
60. The Guidelines for Financial Institutions in Complying with Fair Credit Reporting A ct,
supra note 13, at 1 11,201-09, seems to support this position in its choice of illustrations for
section 604(3)(E). Suggested examples include a consumer who wishes to establish a checking
account, and a builder checking the financial condition of a prospective buyer. Id. I 11,203
at 59,760.
61. See notes 105-14 infra and accompanying text.
62. Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter of May 27, 1971, 4 CCH CONSUMER
CREDIT GUIDE 99,444 at 89,400 (1971). But see notes 105-14 infra and accompanying text.
63. FCRA § 619, 15 U.S.C. § 1681q (1970). Apparently false representations as to either
the purpose for which such information will be used or with respect to the identity of the person
requesting the information would suffice to constitute a violation of this provision. The penalty
stipulated is a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or
both. Id.
64. Id. § 620, 15 U.S.C. § 1681r (1970). Again the sanction is a fine of not more than
$5,000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Id. The FCRA has been criticized
for its failure to adequately protect the consumer's right to privacy. See Note, Fair Credit
Reporting Act, supra note 3, at 259-61. Certainly these criminal sanctions reflect a congres-
sional concern that consumer reports not be dispensed in a casual fashion or misused. However,
it is asserted that prosecution is unlikely because "no one who would be subject to prosecution
will voluntarily notify the consumer of the issuance of the illegal report, nor will he list it in his
business records." Id. at 261 n.54. While this could be the case,the provision may be an effective
deterrent. Few criminal statutes are adopted with the hope or expectation that those guilty of
violating them will turn themselves in to law enforcement authorities.
65. FCRA § 617, 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (1970). This provision reflects a change requested
by the House conferees on Public Law 91-508. The Senate bill imposed liability only in case of
gross negligence. CoNF. REP. at 4416.
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compliance" with its provisions. 7 In the case of negligent noncompli-
ance, the consumer is entitled to recover actual damages" and reason-
able attorney's fees if the action is successful. In the case of willful
noncompliance the consumer may also recover punitive damages."
Such actions may be brought "in any appropriate United States
district court without regard to the amount in controversy," or in any
other court of competent jurisdiction .71
66. FCRA § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 168 In (1970).
67. There has been extensive writing on the doctrine of conditional privilege which, as
applied to credit reporting agencies, requires a plaintiff to prove actual malice on the part of a
reporting agency in order to recover in an action for defamation. See, e.g., Comment, The
Consumer vs. the Credit Bureau: Whom Does the Law Protect?, supra note 6, at 219-22; Note,
Credit Investigations and the Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, supra note 5, at 513-18;
Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, supra note 11, at 1050-54. As of 1971 only
two states (Georgia and Idaho), which had considered the matter, had failed to grant such a
privilege to credit reporting agencies. Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, supra,
at 1050-51. Naturally, this doctrine has militated against recovery in such cases since express
intent to harm is normally difficult to prove. The approach taken by the FCRA is different.
The Act requires reporting agencies and users to maintain reasonable procedures to ensure
compliance. See FCRA §§ 606(c), 607, 615(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681d(c), 1681e, 1681m(c)
(1970). One exception occurs in the public record information provisions, where strict
procedures are required. Id. § 613(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(2) (1970). Civil liability is then
imposed for failure to maintain the kind of procedures required by the Act. Id. §§ 616, 617,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681h, 1681o (1970). Thus, as suggested in one criticism, it is possible for "a
reasonably accurate credit bureau [to] send an erroneous report to a user which has reasonable
notification procedures, but . . . fails to notify . . ." with the result that neither the reporting
agency nor the user is liable. Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, supra, at 1067.
Such a result is inevitable under a negligence theory, for to do otherwise would be to impose
strict liability. On the other hand, with the assistance of appropriate discovery procedures, the
consumer is much more likely to be able to prove that a given procedure is unreasonable or
ineffective, than he is to prove that a reporting agency or user harbored malice, and to this extent
the FCRA places him in a more favorable position. In addition, of course, the consumer retains
the right to have inaccurate information corrected. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
Once a user or reporting agency discloses information to a consumer pursuant to the
provisions of the FCRA, he is precluded from bringing an action in defamation, invasion of
privacy, or negligence, except with respect to false information furnished with malice or intent
to injure, and is relegated to showing either negligent or wilful noncompliance with the provi-
sions of the Act. FCRA § 6 10(e), 15 U.S.C. 168 1h(e) (1970). Such actions are not precluded,
however, when the consumer obtains the information independently of agency or user disclo-
sures. COMPLIANCE WITH FCRA " 11,313, at 59,810.
68. FCRA § 617(l), 15 U.S.C. § 168 1o(I) (1970).
69. Id. § 617(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16810(2) (1970).
70. Id. § 616(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(2) (1970). S. 823, the Senate bill, provided that
punitive damages should not be less than $100 nor more than $1000. S. 823, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. § 606(2) (1969), reprinted in supra note 7, at 21. At the request of the House conferees
the floor and ceiling on the amount of punitive damages were removed. CONF. REP. at 4416.
71. FCRA § 618, 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (1970). An action must be brought within two years
from the time liability arises unless the defendant has misrepresented information material to
the establishment of his liability, in which case the action may be brought within two years after
the misrepresentation has been discovered.
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Responsibility for administrative enforcement of the FCRA is
vested in the FTC72 and in eight other administrative bodies. 3 With
respect to the FTC, violation of the FCRA constitutes an "unfair or
deceptive" act in commerce within the meaning of section 5(a) of the
72. Id. § 621(a), 15 U.S.C. § 168Is(a) (1970).
73. Id. § 621(b), 15 U.S.C. § 168 ls(b) (1970). Compliance is enforced under section 8 of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act by the Comptroller of the Currency (with respect to national
banks), the Federal Reserve Board (with respect to member banks of the Federal Reserve
System other than national banks), and the Board of Directors of Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (with respect to banks insured by the FDIC other than members of the Federal
Reserve System). Id. § 621(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(b)(l) (1970). The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board is charged with enforcing compliance, acting either directly or through the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, with respect to institutions subject to section 5(d) of
the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, institutions subject to section 407 of the National Housing
Act, and institutions subject to sections 6(i) and 17 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act.
FCRA § 621(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(b)(2) (1970). The Administrator of the National
Credit Union Administration is charged with enforcing compliance with respect to any Federal
Credit Union subject to the Federal Credit Union Act. Id. § 621(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 168 ls(b)(3)
(1970). The Interstate Commerce Commission is charged with enforcing compliance with re-
spect to any-common carrier under its jurisdiction. Id. § 621(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 168 ls(b)(4)
(1970). The Civil Aeronautics Board is charged with enforcing compliance with respect to any
air carriers or foreign air carriers subject to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
FCRA § 621 (b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 168 ls(b)(5). And the Secretary of Agriculture is charged with
enforcing compliance with respect to activities subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921
(except as provided in section 406 of that Act). FCRA § 621(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 168 ls(b)(6)
(1970).
The foregoing itemization serves also to illustrate the broad scope of the FCRA. With such
a large number of enforcement agencies it seems almost inevitable that conflicting interpreta-
tions and compliance provisions will be issued and that the quality of administrative enforce-
ment will vary, depending to some extent on the interest of each agency in the FCRA. At the
outset, however, it seems that this problem has been overcome, at least in part, as a result of
cooperation among some of the agencies which resulted in the issuance of a single set of guide-
lines for all financial institutions. See note 13 supra. The Administrator of the National Credit
Union Administration has issued a separate guide for compliance, but this is confined largely
to a summary of the provisions of the FCRA and is not inconsistent with the guidelines issued
by the FTC. See NCUA Guide to Fair Credit Reporting, P-H CREDIT UNION GUIDE, CON-
SUMER AND COMMERCIAL CREDIT 11,895-11,898 (May 28, 1971). The rationale behind this
enforcement scheme seems to be a desire not to subject consumer reporting agencies and users
of reports to regulation by more than one federal agency. See S. REP. No. 517, at 7 which states:
"Compliance would be further enforced by the Federal Trade Commission with respect to
consumer reporting agencies and users of reports who are not regulated by another Federal
Agency" (emphasis supplied). The wisdom of such an approach seems questionable inasmuch
as there is no indication that such agencies as the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Interstate
Commerce Commission have any particular expertise which qualifies them to administer the
FCRA. Nor, on the other hand, would it seem anomalous for an airline or railroad to be subject
to regulation by, for example, the FTC to the extent that they might engage in credit reporting
or in using consumer reports. Consequently it seems that Congress might better have opted for
uniform and consistent enforcement by one agency, such as the FTC.
THE FCRA
FTC Act 74 and is subject to enforcement under section 5(b) 75 "ir-
respective of whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets
any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal Trade Commission
Act."17  While the FTC is apparently not authorized to promulgate
substantive rules with respect to the FCRA, 77 it may establish proce-
dural rules, require the filing of reports, and conduct hearings and
investigations. 78 The FTC's efforts to enforce the FCRA have been
74. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970). Similarly, with respect to the other eight administrative
bodies involved in enforcing the FCRA, violations of the FCRA are deemed to be violations of
the substantive provisions by which those agencies are governed. FCRA § 621(c), 15
U.S.C. § 1681s(c)(1970).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). This provision authorizes the FTC to issue cease and desist
orders after proper notice, hearings, etc. Failure to comply after an order has become final may
result in a civil penalty of not more than $5,000 for each violation, and in cases of continuing
failure each day of continuance is deemed a separate offense. Id. § 45(1) (1970). A violator of
the FCRA is subject to this penal provision. FCRA § 621(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a) (1970).
The eight other administrative agencies involved in enforcing the FCRA may also impose
any sanctions on violators under their jurisdiction that they are otherwise authorized by law to
impose. Id. § 621(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(c) (1970).
76. FCRA § 621(a), 15 U.S.C. § 168 ls(a) (1970).
77. Id. The statute provides that the FTC "shall have . . . procedural, investigative, and
enforcement powers, including the power to issue procedural rules in enforcing compliance
.... " Similarly, the pertinent FTC procedural rule indicates that Commission interpretations
of the FCRA "are not substantive rules and do not have the force or effect of statutory
provisions," but rather are like industry guides and advisory in nature. 36 Fed. Reg. 9294
(197 1), as amended, id. at 18788 (interpretations: nature and purpose). While it would perhaps
be desirable for the FTC to have substantive rule-making powers in that this would undoubtedly
expedite its proceedings, the issuance of opinions, including informal staff opinions, seems to
achieve almost the same result. The Commission indicates, for example, that failure to comply
with its interpretations may result in corrective action. Id. For an example of an informal staff
opinion which gives the appearance that the FTC is setting rates, see Excerpts from Informal
Staff Opinion Letter of June 2, 1971, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,428 (1971),
wherein, in response to an inquiry concerning what a reasonable fee for making disclosures
under section 609 of the FCRA would be, it is carefully pointed out that the FTC does not have
the authority to determine what a reasonable fee would be, but only to determine what would
be an unreasonable charge. The opinion then goes on to indicate that the FTC has not made a
determination that a $5.00 charge would be unreasonable. Cf. Project, Federal Administrative
Law Developments-1970, 1971 DUKE L.J. 149, 200-09, for discussion of a case in which the
Civil Aeronautics Board attempted to set rates in this same fashion in violation of prescribed
rate-making procedure.
While one authority has indicated that the Act "does not . . . even authorize formulation
of regulations to assist in its implementation ... ," see Koon, supra note 12, at 54 n.6, section
621, 15 U.S.C. § 168 1s(c) (1970), provides that each of the eight other agencies "may exercise
. . . any other authority conferred on it by law," in order to secure compliance with the Act.
This provision leaves in doubt precisely to what extent these agencies may act.
78. FCRA § 621(a), 15 U.S.C. § 168 ls(a) (1970).
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vigorous and aggressive, 71 and its activities in interpreting the Act
provide much of the basis for the ensuing section of this note."0
The FCRA 's Applicability to Business Credit Reports
Perhaps the most difficult and important problems presented by
the FCRA are, first, determining precisely what it is that elevates
information to the status of a consumer report 8I and, second, deter-
mining for what purposes a consumer report may be used. 2 These two
problems are to be viewed in the context of two dominant aspects of
congressional purpose-the desire to protect the consumer who is the
subject of credit reports,' and the desire to exclude credit reports of
a purely commercial nature from the purview of the Act.8 It is within
this larger context that the problem of the FCRA's applicability to
credit reports on businesses must be discussed.
What is a "consumer report?" For purposes of clarity the defini-
tion of the term "consumer report" may be set forth schematically
in pertinent part as follows:
79. Thus far enforcement efforts of the FTC have manifested themselves largely in the form
of informal staff opinions and the staff publication of COMPLIANCE WITH FCRA. The views
expressed in these statements are purely advisory and not binding in any way upon the Commis-
sion. 36 Fed. Reg. 9293-94 (1971) (examination, counseling and staff advice), as amended, Id.
at 18788. A reading of these materials conveys the impression that the FTC is actively attempt-
ing to bring about compliance with the purposes of the FCRA with respect to both users and
consumer reporting agencies. In a recent speech the director of the FTC's Office of Policy
Planning and Evaluation explained that the issuance of informal staff opinions was only the
first stage of the FTC's enforcement program. In the second stage, to begin shortly, the Com-
mission itself will issue interpretations on the application of the FCRA. In the third stage, the
FTC regional offices are expected to play a vital role in enforcement. 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE, Report Bulletin 78, at 7 (Oct. 12, 1971).
80. The FCRA, although part of a growing federal presence in the area of consumer credit
law, see Felsenfeld, Competing State and Federal Roles in Consumer Credit Law, 45 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 487, 512-15 (1970), does not totally pre-empt state legislation on the same subject.
FCRA § 622, 15 U.S.C. § 168 It (1970), provides that the FCRA exempts no one from com-
pliance with state laws relating to credit information except to the extent that such laws are
inconsistent with the FCRA, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
8 1. The definition of the term "consumer report" is set forth at note 52 supra and accompa-
nying text.
82. The purposes for which a consumer report may be permissibly used are set forth at notes
53-58 supra and accompanying text.
83. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
84. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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The term "consumer report" means. . . any communication
of any information
which is
used
or expected to be used
or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of
serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility. . ..
The foregoing scheme indicates, at the outset, that an item of infor-
mation does not attain the status of a consumer report unless the
information is communicated. The clause "used or expected to be
used or collected in whole or in part," however, apparently refers to
the antecedent "information" rather than to the word "communica-
tion" or the noun phrase "communication of any information," since
it makes little sense to speak of a communication, whether described
in one word or four, which is "collected in whole or in part." This
means that while an item of information does not attain the status of
a consumer report until communicated, the information which will
become a consumer report if communicated is defined both in terms
of its use or expected use after the communication and in terms of
the purpose for which it was collected prior to the communication.
The Senate report accompanying the FCRA indicates that the Act
"covers reports on consumers when used for obtaining credit reports
or business insurance or employment," but that it does not extend to
"business credit reports or business insurance reports." 8 This de-
scription appears to envisage a "use" standard for consumer reports,
i.e., a requirement that a report's contemplated use be for a consumer
purpose before the report attains the status of a consumer report.
Such a reading of the definition of consumer report can certainly be
justified with respect to the phrase "used or expected to be used,"
since a consumer report, up to this point, is simply defined as any
communication of any information which is used or expected to be
used 7 for one of the enumerated purposes s.8 The "use" standard for
85. FCRA § 603(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1970). For the complete definition of "con-
sumer report," see text accompanying note 52 supra.
86. S. REP. No. 517.
87. The phrase "expected to be used" is undoubtedly intended to cover the situation in
which the user of the consumer report misuses the information contained therein, despite his
certification or promise that he would use it only for purposes permitted under the Act.
88. The analogous language of the initial drafts of both S. 823 and H.R. 16340 contained
definitions of "consumer report" which required that information actually be communicated
by a consumer reporting agency before the definition was met. S. 823 provided: "[t]he term
'credit report' means any written, oral, or other communication of any credit rating, or of any
information which is sought or given for the purpose of serving as a basis for a credit rating."
S. 823, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 163(c) (1969), reprinted in Hearings on S. 823. supra note 8, at
6. With respect to the second clause of this definition, it seems clear that the word "communica-
tion" is to be read in tandem with the word "information" so as to mean "or other communica-
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determining what constitutes a consumer report breaks down, how-
ever, with respect to information "collected in whole or in part",9 for
consumer purposes since this phrase can have reference only to the
purpose for which the information was originally gathered, quite
apart from its eventual use. Hence the "or collected . . ." language
appears to establish an additional and independent "original pur-
pose" test, which focuses on the intent of the gatherer at the time of
collection, for ascertaining whether information subsequently com-
municated is a consumer report.'" Significantly, the Senate report
accompanying the FCRA also contains language which supports such
a reading of the "or collected . . ." provision: "[a] 'consumer report'
is defined. . . as a report on an individual when the information has
been collected or is to be used for credit, insurance, or employment
purposes."'"
tion . . . of any information." H.R. 16340 provided: "[t]he term 'consumer report' means any
written, oral or other communication of any information bearing on an individual's credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteris-
tics, or mode of living and which is used or expected to be used as a factor in establishing the
individual's eligibility for (I) credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or
household purposes; or (2) employment." H.R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 13(c) (1970),
reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 16340. supra note 7, at 3. The definition of "consumer report"
finally enacted appeared in the amended version of S. 823 adopted by the Senate in 1969 and
was not subsequently changed.
89. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
90. It must be made clear here that it is not contended that a consumer report exists
independent of the communication of the information in question, but rather that a communica-
tion of information, when the information contained therein was originally collected for the
purpose of future use in a consumer report, is a consumer report regardless of the use to which
the communication is to be put by the user. This is in direct contrast, and a significant supple-
ment, to the "use" test provision, under which information collected for any purpose at all,
but subsequently communicated for the purpose of establishing the consumer's eligibility for
credit or another benefit, is a consumer report.
The "or collected" language has been largely overlooked by commentators. See, e.g., Koon,
note 12 supra at 53, wherein it is recognized that reports may fall within the scope of the FCRA
"without regard to the purpose for which the report is sought," but presumably only because
of the reference in the definition of "consumer report" to section 604's permissible purposes,
one of which is for a legitimate business need for the information in connection with a business
transaction involving the consumer. Ignored entirely in the footnote paraphrase of the definition
of a consumer report is the "or collected" language. Id. at 53 n.5. Moreover, it is not entirely
clear that the reference in the definition of consumer report to 604(3)(E) is, as the author
contends, "likely a creature of inattentive draftsmanship rather than design," id., since the "or
collected in whole or in part" language itself brings reports within the scope of the Act without
regard to the purpose for which the report is sought.
91. S. REP. No. 517 (emphasis added).
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The FTC staff has adopted precisely the reading of the "or col-
lected" language suggested above:
A reporting agency or requesting party cannot contend that the law does not
apply because the report will be used for some purpose other than credit,
insurance or employment and, therefore, it is not a 'consumer report.' The law
applies because the information was collected by the agency for one or more
of the permissible purposes and, therefore, it is not available except for those
purposes. 2
In support of the FTC's view it is to be noted that several other
sections of the FCRA likewise regulate information gathered by a
consumer agency from the time it is collected. As was earlier de-
scribed, for example, when a consumer receives disclosures from a
consumer reporting agency, the reporting agency must disclose "[t]he
nature and substance of all information (except medical information)
in its files on the consumer . . -. .3 Similarly the procedures for
correcting disputed information94 clearly extend to all the information
in a consumer's file,95 and not just to information included in a con-
sumer report. There can be no doubt that all information collected
by a reporting agency is subject to some degree of regulation under
the FCRA;8 hence it cannot be argued that the FTC staff reading of
the "or collected" language unduly broadens the scope of the Act.
The only alternative to the FTC interpretation would be to adopt
solely a "use" requirement17 in defining a consumer report and to
disregard entirely the words "or collected." To ignore this language
would not be appropriate in view of the very careful scrutiny given
the provisions of the FCRA by both the credit information industry
and the Senate drafters. 8
92. COMPLIANCE WITH FCRA ' 11,306, at 59,789.
93. FCRA § 609(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(l) (1970); see discussion of the disclosure
provisions at notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text. The term "file" as used in this provi-
sion means "all of the information on that consumer recorded and retained by a consumer
reporting agency regardless of how the information is stored." FCRA § 603(g), 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(g)(1970).
94. See notes 25-31 supra and accompanying text.
95. FCRA § 611(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a) (1970).
96. This includes information collected prior to the effective date of the Act. See Excerpt
from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter of April 7, 1971, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE Ir 99,523 (1971).
97. See text following note 86 supra.
98. The consumer credit industry participated actively in drafting S. 823 in its amended
form, and apparently there were "hours and hours of negotiations" over a period of several
months on the bill. Denny, supra note 9, at 584. This account is substantially confirmed by
Senator Proxmire. See 115 CONG. REC. 33410 (1969) (remarks of Senator Proxmire). But see
116 CONG. REc. H 10053-56 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1970) (remarks of Congressmen Bow, Widnall,
and Wylie).
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The practical result of the "original purpose" test" is to render
any information communicated by a consumer reporting agency-so
long as it was collected for consumer purposes'"-a consumer report
within the meaning of the FCRA. This result has been acknowledged
in an FTC staff opinion which indicates that "no report prepared for
business purposes may contain information collected for the purpose
of making consumer reports, or the entire report becomes a consumer
report."'" And again: "if . . .information .. .originally collected
for consumer purposes . . .[is] subsequently used in a business credit
or business insurance report, then such a report would become a
consumer report as defined in the Act."'0 2 Assuming then, hypotheti-
cally, that a consumer reporting agency wanted to enter the business
credit reporting field,"'s and that no other provisions of the FCRA
stood in its way, it would have two means of doing so. The first would
be to collect the information it planned to use for business reporting
purposes jointly with consumer information and utilize the same stor-
age facilities for such data, but to comply with all the requirements
of the FCRA in dispensing such information. A second means would
be to establish a parallel or separate organizational structure, not only
for the storage of data, but for its collection and handling as well.'"
99. See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
100. Even if the information was not collected for use in consumer reports, it would, of
course, be subject to the requirements of the Act if it were nonetheless ultimately used in a
consumer report. See note 90 supra.
101. Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter of May 18, 1971, supra note 57, at
89,382.
102. Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion, Letter of May 19, 1971, 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,424, at 89,384 (1971).
103. This possibility seems not unlikely in view of the fact that consumer reporting agencies
so doing would have two natural advantages-expertise in collecting credit data and a large data
base upon which to found such an operation. See, e.g., Pogue v. Retail Credit Co., - F.2d
- (4th Cir. 1972) (action against a consumer reporting agency for an alleged breach of
contract with respect to a report on a loan company).
104. Establishing such a separate organizational structure would undoubtedly reduce the
natural advantages a consumer reporting agency would have in entering the commercial report-
ing field, note 103 supra, and limit them to management expertise.
It is arguable that consumer reporting agencies could comply with the Act by segregating
data before storage and, by placing the same data in separate storage banks, take the data from
one bank when intended for use in consumer reports, and from another when intended for use
in commercial reports. Indeed, the FTC staff indicates that "[i]n many cases consumer report-
ing agencies are performing both functions although from separate sets of data banks." Ex-
cerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter of June 4, 1971, 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE 99,451 at 89,403 (1971). The FTC staff, however, points out that this practice may
be impermissible, id., and under its reading of the definition of "consumer report" this view is
How may a consumer report be used? Whether a consumer report-
ing agency can even enter the commercial reporting field, however,
depends upon the construction given section 604,105 the "permissible
use" provision of the Act. Consumer reports may primarily be used
for credit, insurance, or employment, involving the consumer. In ad-
dition, section 604(3)(E) provides that consumer reports may be fur-
nished to a person who "otherwise has a legitimate business need for
the information in connection with a business transaction involving
the consumer."'0 6 The FTC staff has construed the latter provision
narrowly, indicating that it authorizes the use of consumer reports
only for business transactions undertaken for personal, family, or
household purposes.0 7 Because consumer reports may be used for "no
other" purposes than those specified in section 604,108 if the foregoing
FTC staff interpretation of section 604(3)(E) is correct, consumer
reporting agencies would be wholly precluded from issuing consumer
reports for all but a limited number of business transactions." 9 There
are several persuasive reasons why such a restrictive interpretation
should not be adopted. First, it must be observed that the FTC staff
reading of section 604(3)(E) gives a paradoxical meaning to the
phrase "or collected in whole or in part" in section 603(d) of the
Act"0 since any information collected in part for consumer purposes
could thereafter be used only for consumer purposes. That this mean-
ing was unintended by the FTC is evident from the fact that the
FTC staff itself has on occasion indicated in staff opinions that con-
sumer reports could be used for commercial purposes so long as the
provisions of the Act are complied with."'
A second reason why the FTC staff interpretation of section
undoubtedly correct, inasmuch as information collected for use in consumer reports is still
collected for use in consumer reports no matter how many storage banks it is placed in. To
permit separate data banks to obviate the need for compliance with other provisions of the Act
would be a sham, since its only regulatory effect would be to impose the cost of an additional
data bank on consumer reporting agencies, after which they could proceed to use the business
information without further regulation.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (1970).
106. Id. § 168lb(3)(E)(1970).
107. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 168 lb (1970).
109. The one exception to this would occur when a consumer gave written authorization
that a report on him could be used for some other purpose. FCRA § 604(2), 15
U.S.C. § 168lb(2) (1970).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1970).
Ill. See notes 101-02 supra and accompanying text.
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604(3)(E) appears unduly restrictive is indicated by a reading of that
provision itself. The word "consumer" is defined in the Act as "an
individual."112 Substituting the latter term for the word "consumer"
in the definition, the Act in plain language authorizes the use of
consumer reports with respect to "a business transaction involving an
individual." To insert a "personal, family, or household" limitation
in this context results in a substantive alteration of the language, and
does not appear to be warranted.
It is also pertinent to inquire whether the FTC staff reading of
section 604(3)(E) in any way enhances or contributes to the regulatory
scheme established by the FCRA. The effect of such an interpretation
is to prevent consumer reporting agencies from issuing reports in
connection with a transaction involving a sole proprietorship, a single-
shareholder corporation or any other business'entity involving an
individual where the transaction was not undertaken for a personal,
family or household purpose. To the extent that a need for informa-
tion provided in this context exists, it will almost surely be provided
by business reporting agencies which are entirely unregulated in their
operations if consumer reporting agencies cannot do so."' While it
seems clear that Congress did not intend to regulate the business
credit reporting field," 4 at the same time there is no evidence that
Congress intended to close this field to consumer reporting agencies
which comply with the provisions of the FCRA.
At some time in the future a court will be confronted with the
problem of interpreting the FCRA. When it does so it should not
confront the "or collected in whole or in part" clause or the FTC
interpretation of section 604(3)(E) without being cognizant of the
interrelation of the two provisions. By giving the "or collected..."
language a broad construction, rather than entirely disregarding it,
the courts would ensure that the protective provisions of the FCRA
are applicable to all transactions involving the consumer. At the same
time, by disregarding the restrictive interpretation of section
604(3)(E) advanced by the FTC, a court would ensure that the busi-
ness operations of consumer reporting agencies are not unduly cur-
112. FCRA § 603(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(c) (1970).
113. See, e.g., Pogue v. Retail Credit Co., - r.2d - (4th Cir. 1972), a pre-FCRA
case in which both Retail Credit Co. and Dun & Bradstreet issued credit reports on a loan
company.
114. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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tailed and that consumer reporting agencies could compete in the
commercial credit field, subject to the requirements imposed by the
FCRA.

